

**The Color of Devolution:  
Race, Place, and  
the Punitive Turn in Poverty Management**

By

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A Presentation at the Workshop on Poverty and Place, Cambridge-MIT Institute, Cambridge University, St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, England, September 28-29, 2006

**The data analysis in this presentation comes from a project with**


**Richard Fording, University of Kentucky**

**Joe Soss, University of Wisconsin-Madison**

For more information about the project, see:


Richard Fording, Sanford Schram and Joe Soss, (2006) "Devolution, Discretion, and Local Variation in TANF Sanctioning," Lexington: University of Kentucky, Center on Poverty Research Discussion Paper DP2006-04,  
<http://www.ukcpr.org/Publications/DP2006-04.pdf>.

**Figure 1. Proportional Change in Rates of Incarceration and AFDC/TANF Receipt, 1990-2001**




Note: TANF caseload data are from the Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, <http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/news/stats/3697.htm>. Incarceration data are from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/mcrt.htm>.

**Figure 2. States with Highest Growth in the Number of Prisons: Number of Prisons in 2000 and the Percent Change in the Number of Prisons, 1979-2000**




Source: Sarah Lawrence and Jeremy Travis (2004). *The New Landscape of Imprisonment: Mapping America's Prison Expansion*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, Justice Policy Center. [http://www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/The\\_New\\_Landscape\\_of\\_Imprisonment.pdf](http://www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/The_New_Landscape_of_Imprisonment.pdf)

FIGURE 3. Black TANF Caseload and State Corrections Spending by TANF Regime Type



Note: TANF regime stringency are based on 2001 state TANF policies as measured by the Urban Institute and Gainesborough 2003; corrections spending data are from *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1999* (2000: 5-9, Table 1.5).

Figure 4. Florida's 24 Workforce Regions




**Table 1: Average Monthly Sanction Rates across 24 Workforce Regions in Florida**

Workforce Board	Sanction Rate
17 Polk County Workforce Development Board, Inc.	51.97
16 Pasco-Hernando Jobs & Education Partnership Regional Board, Inc.	45.72
22 Broward Workforce Development Board	45.09
1 Escarosa Regional Workforce Development Board, Inc.	44.40
13 Brevard Workforce Development Board, Inc.	43.48
8 First Coast Workforce Development, Inc.	41.67
14 Pinellas Workforce Development Board	41.43
19 Heartland Workforce Investment Board, Inc.	41.08
4 Gulf Coast Workforce Development Board	39.16
3 Chipola Regional Workforce Planning Board	39.09
10 Citrus Levy Marion Workforce Development Board	38.61
15 Hillsborough County Workforce Board	38.58
18 Suncoast Workforce Development Board, Inc.	38.28
Statewide Average	38.18
21 Palm Beach County Workforce Development Board	37.33
11 Workforce Development Board of Flagler and Volusia Counties, Inc.	37.12
20 Workforce Development Board of the Treasure Coast	34.72
24 Southwest Florida Workforce Development Board	34.48
2 Okaloosa-Walton Jobs & Education Partnership, Inc.	33.95
9 Alachua, Bradford Workforce Development Board	33.95
7 Florida Crown Workforce Development Board	33.83
23 Miami-Dade & Monroe County Jobs & Education Partnership	33.82
12 Workforce Central Florida	32.76
5 Big Bend Jobs and Education Council, Inc.	30.31
6 North Florida Workforce Development Board	25.47


Note: The sanction rate is the average percentage of the caseload that is sanctioned each month during the period October 2001 – March 2004.

**Figure 5. Total Adult TANF Caseload by Race/Ethnic Identification, January 2000-December 2003**


**A. Total Adult Caseload**




**B. Adult Caseload, by Race/Ethnicity**



**Figure 6. Total TANF Sanctions and Non-Sanction Exits in Florida, January 2000 – December 2003**



**Figure 7. Monthly TANF Sanction Rates (% of TANF Adult Caseload)**



**Table 2.**  
**Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Effect of Individual and Community-Level Characteristics on Sanction Initiation**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>I</b>	<b>II</b>	<b>III</b>	<b>IV</b>
<b>Individual Characteristics</b>				
Gender (male )	1.209**	1.201**	1.196**	1.182**
Age	.988**	.989**	.990**	.990**
Single-Parent	.888**	.876**	.857**	.840**
Wage Income (t-1)	.989**	.991**	.990**	.990*
<b>Education (reference =&gt;H.S.)</b>				
Less than H.S. Education	1.454**	1.465**	1.456**	1.442**
H.S. Education	1.122**	1.128**	1.128**	1.120**
<b>Race/Ethnicity (reference=white)</b>				
<b>Black</b>				
3 months	.876*	.943*	.953*	.954*
6 months	1.035	1.123**	1.134**	1.129**
9 months	1.223*	1.338**	1.349**	1.336*
<b>Hispanic</b>				
3 months	.781**	.867*	.931**	.925**
6 months	.866	.967	1.042	1.076
9 months	.960	1.078	1.165	1.251
<b>Political Environment</b>				
Local Conservatism Index	---	1.668**	1.405**	1.636**
Black%	---	---	.997	.996
Hispanic%	---	---	.990**	.996
<b>Socio-Economic Environment</b>				
<b>Annual Wage -</b>				
Food Service/Drinking Places	---	---	.974	.963
Unemployment Rate (t-1)	---	---	1.014	1.010
Poverty Rate	---	---	1.035**	1.038**
Population (in millions)	---	---	1.278**	1.351**
Per Capita TANF Caseload (t-1)	---	---	.847**	.866**
Month of Year	---	---	(see Fig. 7)(not reported)	
<b>Number of Subjects</b>	64,630	64,630	64,630	55,354
<b>Number of Failures</b>	25,337	25,337	25,337	22,511
<b>Time at Risk (Person-Months)</b>	183,111	183,111	183,111	152,338

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01


Note: The sample for this analysis is consists of all new TANF clients who entered TANF from January 2001 through December 2002. All clients are observed for a maximum of twelve months (clients who exit without being sanctioned, or who were sanctioned after twelve months, are treated as censored). Cell entries are hazard ratios, and reflect the proportional change in the hazard of sanction, given a one-unit increase in the independent variable of interest.

**Construction of Index of County Political Ideology**

To construct our index of local ideology we collected data on 18 ideologically relevant constitutional amendments that appeared on a statewide ballot for ratification from 1996 through 2004. We computed the percentage of "yes" votes for each amendment, for each county, and conducted a factor analysis using all 18 amendments (thus 18 variables, N=67 counties). The subjects of these amendments are listed in the table below.


<b>Year</b>	<b>Amendment</b>
1996	Tax Limitation
1996	Pollution Costs
1996	Sugar Fee
1998	Death Penalty (For)
1998	Tax Exemption
1998	Public Education
1998	Basic Rights
1998	Election Reform
1998	Gun Control
2000	Public Transit
2002	Smoking Ban
2002	Universal Pre-K
2002	Class Size Reduction
2002	Animal Cruelty
2004	Abortion Rights (Limit)
2004	Minimum Wage
2004	Medical Compensation Limits
2004	Slot Machines

**Figure 8. Cumulative Survival Function for a Typical TANF Adult,  
by Local Political Ideology**




Note: Survival rates are estimated for a 31 year-old white woman with 12 years of education and average level of wage income. These estimates are based on the results presented in column II, Table 3.

**Figure 9. Predicted Odds of Being Sanctioned for Black TANF Clients  
(Compared to White Non-Hispanic Client)**



Odds ratios are derived from the model in column II in Table 3. Note: The horizontal line at 1 on the Y axis represents equal odds – i.e., the odds of being sanctioned for a black client are 100 percent of the odds of being sanctioned for a white client. Values above this line indicate that the odds of being sanctioned are higher for a black client than for a white client. Odds ratios should be interpreted as multipliers. Thus, an odds ratio of 2 indicates that if Group A has 1:1 (1 out of 2) odds of being sanctioned (50 percent), Group B has 2:1 (2 out of 3) odds of being sanctioned (67 percent).

**Figure 10. Predicted Odds of Being Sanctioned for Hispanic TANF Clients (Compared to White Non-Hispanic Client)**




Odds ratios are derived from the model in column II in Table 3. *Note:* The horizontal line at 1 on the Y axis represents equal odds – i.e., the odds of being sanctioned for a Hispanic client are 100 percent of the odds of being sanctioned for a white client. Values above this line indicate that the odds of being sanctioned are higher for a Hispanic client than for a white client. Odds ratios should be interpreted as multipliers. Thus, an odds ratio of 2 indicates that if Group A has 1:1 (1 out of 2) odds of being sanctioned (50 percent), Group B has 2:1 (2 out of 3) odds of being sanctioned (67 percent).


**Figure 11.**

**Effect of Political Environment by Race**

**Proportional Increase in the Predicted Probability of Being Sanctioned**



**Figure 12. Estimated Hazard Ratio and Total Tourism/Recreation Taxable Sales, by Month of Year**



Source: Hazard ratios are taken from the model in column III of Table 3.  
Sales data reflect 2002.

**Table 3. Effect of Regional Performance Measures on Regional Sanction Rates**

Independent Variables	All Clients	Race of Clients		Clients' Education	
		Black	White	< 12 yrs.	≥ 12 yrs.
Performance Ranking	.127**	.200**	.137*	.234**	.173**
Participation Rate	-.074**	-.126**	-.033	-.101**	-.093**
Average Time on Current Spell	-.873**	-.357	-1.205**	-1.807**	-.642
Average Spell Number	-1.877	-.962	-2.707*	-2.227	-1.798
Average Number of Children	3.980*	1.738	2.392	3.066	.909
Average Age of Youngest Child	-.181	-.047	.808	-.375	.096
% Single	-.069	-.054	-.046	-.053	.077
% Male	.061	-.035	.119	-.072	.098
%Citizens	-.180	-.339*	.077	.024	-.050
%Black	-.147**	---	---	-.036	-.122**
%Hispanic	-.166*	---	---	-.005	-.125
Average Age of Adult Clients	-.316	-.878**	-.191	-.031	-.561
Size of Caseloadt-1	-.450	-.661	-1.328*	-2.161**	-.282
Sanction Ratet-1	.271**	.240**	.137**	.131**	.084
R <sup>2</sup>	.58	.48	.46	.52	.49
Sample Size	(N=720)	(N=720)	(N=720)	(N=552)	(N=552)

**Table 4. Effect of Regional Performance Measures on Regional Sanction Rates, by Local Political Culture**

Independent Variables	Most Liberal Regions	Most Conservative Regions
Performance Ranking	.017	.180**
Participation Rate	-.124**	-.037
Average Time on Current Spell	-1.967**	-.437
Average Spell Number	-.965	-5.552**
Average Number of Children	.189	3.910
Average Age of Youngest Child	-1.746**	1.274
% Single	.049	-.043
% Male	.012	.198
%Citizens	.142	-.464**
%Black	-.238**	-.140
%Hispanic	.020	-.333**
Average Age of Adult Clients	.311	-.792
Size of Caseload <sub>t-1</sub>	-1.117*	1.249
Sanction Rate <sub>t-1</sub>	.241**	.245*
R <sup>2</sup>	.68	.48
Sample Size	(N=360)	(N=360)

\*\*p<.05, \*p<.10, two-tailed test.

Note: The dependent variable is the monthly sanction rate (# sanctioned / caseload \* 100). *Performance Ranking* is defined as the change in the average monthly ranking (1-24) for the entered wage rate, the welfare return rate, and the entered employment rate. This variable is measured at a lag of three months and is measured cumulatively within each fiscal year. Slope coefficients are estimated by OLS, while significance tests are based on panel corrected standard errors. All models are estimated with a full set of fixed effects for workforce regions and month of analysis.


**Table 5. Effect of Regional Performance Measures on Regional Sanction Rates, by Local Political Culture and Race of Client**

Independent Variables	Most Liberal Regions		Most Liberal Regions		Most Conservative Regions		Most Conservative Regions	
	Black	White	<12 yrs.	≥ 12 yrs.	Black	White	< 12 yrs.	≥ 12 yrs.
Performance Ranking	.055	.045	-.030	.153	.290**	.176*	.346**	.131
Participation Rate	-.117**	-.075**	-.168**	-.138**	-.120**	.013	-.059	-.099**
Avg. Time on Current Spell	-1.044**	-1.690**	-1.798**	-.386	.608	-.511	-1.687**	-.353
Avg. Spell Number	1.612	-1.849	-.401	-1.095	-1.512	-6.685**	-3.717	-3.428
Avg. Number of Children	1.346	4.118	.109	-3.022	1.679	1.165	3.594	.682
Avg. Age of Youngest Child	-.597	.566	-1.213	-1.516	.573	-.584	.190	1.173
% Single	-.286**	.067	-.283**	.199*	.046	-.067	.007	-.033
% Male	-.481**	.132	-.450**	.371**	.196	.171	.057	-.110
%Citizens	-.613**	-.292	.211	.186	-.297	.341	.049	-.128
%Black	---	---	-.132	-.214**	---	---	.059	-.035
%Hispanic	---	---	.245	.180	---	---	-.041	-.187
Avg. Age of Adult Clients	-.659	-.163	-.143	-.027	-1.122**	-.222	.144	-1.015**
Size of Caseload <sub>t-1</sub>	.031	-2.102**	-1.256	-.840	-1.757	1.618	-12.858**	-6.696*
Sanction Rate <sub>t-1</sub>	.202**	.168**	.120	.012	.236**	.080	.054	.081
R <sup>2</sup>	.59	.53	.65	.59	.42	.40	.42	.46
Sample Size	(N=360)	(N=360)	(N=276)	(N=276)	(N=360)	(N=360)	(N=276)	(N=276)

\*\*p<.05, \*p<.10, two-tailed test.


Note: The dependent variable is the monthly sanction rate (# sanctioned / caseload \* 100). *Performance Ranking* is defined as the change in the average monthly ranking (1-24) for the entered wage rate, the welfare return rate, and the entered employment rate. This variable is measured at a lag of three months and is measured cumulatively within each fiscal year. Slope coefficients are estimated by OLS, while significance tests are based on panel corrected standard errors. All models are estimated with a full set of fixed effects for workforce regions and month of analysis.

**Figure 13. Summary of Effects of Performance Feedback on Regional Sanction Rates**



**Figure 14.**


**Clients with <12 Yrs. Education**




The design: Track average quarterly earnings of a panel of TANF clients, both prior to entering TANF, and then after exiting TANF. Compare the earnings of clients ultimately sanctioned during first spell to clients who exited for other reasons. The sample: All clients entering in January, April, July or October, and exiting in the third month of their spell (March, June, September, December), years 2001-2002 (for a total of 8 cohorts). The selection of these entry/exit months and spell length (3 months) insures that the entire TANF spell spans exactly one quarter, and the exit occurs in the last month of the TANF quarter. Prior to entering TANF, clients are never on TANF. After exiting, clients may or may not be on TANF (for additional spells).

**Figure 15.**

**Clients with 12 Years Education**




**Figure 16.**  
**Probability of Full-Time Work After Leaving Welfare for Sanctioned and Non-Sanctioned Clients**



Dependent variable = 1 when wages for quarter  $\geq$  \$2048 (based on 30 hours per week, 5.25 per hour), 0 = otherwise. Independent variables are sanction status, other individual traits (race, education, marital status, citizenship, age, gender) and selected contextual characteristics (county wage level and poverty%). Logit regressions are cross-sectional, with separate regression for each quarter (3 quarters prior to TANF quarter through 3 quarters after TANF quarter, for a total of 7 regressions). From these regressions we get predicted probabilities for Y=1 for sanctioned vs. non-sanctioned clients (with other independent variables held at their mode or mean). Predicted probability of earning at least \$2048 in a quarter, for typical client, by sanction status.

**Figure 17.**  
**Probability of Full-Time Work After Leaving Welfare for Sanctioned and Non-Sanctioned**  
**Clients**  
**in Most Liberal Environment**



**Figure 17.**  
**Probability of Full-Time Work After Leaving Welfare for Sanctioned and Non-Sanctioned**  
**Clients**  
**in Most Conservative Environment**

